François-Xavier de Peretti | : Notre propos consistera à analyser des textes cartésiens pouvant confirmer une tendance de l’ego à mimer Dieu, à endosser une certaine ressemblance avec Dieu. Nous examinerons pour cela l’énoncé du cogito tel qu’il est formulé dans les Médiations métaphysiques, pour suggérer que la parole de l’ego mime, dans les limites de sa puissance, la puissance performative de la parole de Dieu. Nous considérerons ensuite la manière dont les Méditations métaphysiques sont construites comme un (...) hexaméron, qui donne à nouveau naissance au monde au terme d’un exercice méditatif où le sujet retrouve une place centrale. | : We shall analyze some Cartesian texts able to enlighten a trend of the ego to mimic or to endorse a sort of resemblance to God. For this purpose, we shall consider the cogito, as it is formulated in the Meditations on First Philosophy, and we shall suggest that the ego mimics, in the limits of its own power, the performative power of the word of God. Then, we shall examine how the Meditations on First Philosophy are built as an hexameron which creates again the world at the end of a meditation exercise where the subject gets back to a central position. (shrink)

La tradition française du commentaire cartésien a peu traité du thème des Méditations métaphysiques en tant que méditations. Elle ne l’a toutefois pas totalement ignoré, d’où l’intérêt de faire un point sur les antécédents et les esquisses de ce thème dans la critique philosophique française contemporaine, d’en mesurer la portée en situant les Méditations à l’égard du genre méditatif et de proposer une double interprétation du texte de Descartes, non seulement comme traité de métaphysique, mais aussi comme suite d’exercices volontaires. (...) Cette qualité d’exercices volontaires qui contribue, en grande partie, à son originalité, assigne au texte réputé théorique des Méditations métaphysiques, une finalité éminemment pratique : l’assimilation des vérités métaphysiques et non leur seule démonstration. (shrink)

According to a broadly accepted interpretation, the doubt of the First Meditation gets stronger due to an increasing effectiveness of the reasons for said doubt. I defend a deflationary reading of the doubt of the Meditations insofar as the sceptical arguments used by René Descartes gradually lose power. This reading is obviously not without consequences, which will be mentioned in the conclusion, for the interpretation of the exercise of doubt and, more fundamentally, of the Cartesian doctrine of knowledge.

Résumé Descartes a adopté envers le scepticisme une attitude que d’aucuns parmi ses adversaires ont jugée ambiguë voire coupable. Il a recouru à des arguments sceptiques pour mettre en œuvre son célèbre doute qu’il concevait néanmoins comme l’acte inaugural d’une philosophie en quête de certitude scientifique. Descartes rejetait ainsi la fin poursuivie par les sceptiques et entendait user du doute contre le doute. Cette stratégie fondée sur un scepticisme des moyens pour combattre la fin et l’esprit même du scepticisme s’est-elle (...) révélée pertinente? Richard Popkin a pensé que non, dans son histoire du scepticisme, et conclu à l’échec d’un Descartes « sceptique malgré lui ». Je me propose de nuancer cette thèse de manière significative, suggérant que Descartes, sceptique à un second degré, était bien conscient de la finitude de l’esprit humain et des limites assignables à la recherche de la vérité des choses telles qu’elles sont en soi. (shrink)

Did Descartes manage to overcome the skeptics? If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “refute,” the answer is no, since his hyperbolic doubt harbors several blind spots and is, therefore, not as radical as is commonly argued. In this way, the victory of the cogito is perhaps less decisive and fruitful than it is claimed. If we understand “overcome” in the sense of “remove” or “move beyond,” the answer is yes. Descartes has overcome skepticism, but at the cost of (...) a decision, a sort of bet made in favor of reason based on a confidence in the human mind that is never really subverted. This faith in reason, truth, and specific epistemological principles in Descartes’ philosophy constitute what Wittgenstein calls “hinges,” which are indispensable for doubting and searching for truth. In this sense, Descartes’ anti-skepticism is more a confidence in reason in order to save the possibility of science than the result of a logical refutation. (shrink)

Constituye la primera monografía que, en castellano, se publica sobre Jacques Derrida. Las cuestiones que se abordan aquí nos demuestran, cosa que no es poco, como mediante su pensamiento nos es más lúcida la comprensión de la tradición occidental.

Aquí se presenta una visión panorámica de la herencia filosófica legada por Derrida, pasando revista a los rasgos más característicos del pensamiento derridiano, que se definió a sí mismo como «cierta experiencia aporética de lo imposible». Tras examinar conceptos como los de «fidelidad», «espectro», «acontecimiento» y, por supuesto, «deconstrucción», se hace ver que -según Derrida- la tarea filosófica consistiría en analizar los estratos y sedimentos que configuran el discurso dentro del cual pensamos, con el fin de abrir nuevas perspectivas de (...) futuro y descubrir otros posibles sentidos distintos a los refrendados por la tradición. (shrink)

This study addresses philosophy’s traditional rejection of the sense of smell, taking into account the most unpleasant but also the most beneficial aspects of odour, from antiquity to the present day. The topic is investigated following a thread through several texts by Derrida, Nietzsche, and Freud. It explains the reasons– sometimes apparent, sometimes hidden– behind the most palpable effects of the philosophical marginalization of the sense of smell.

My aim in this paper is to discuss Mill’s notions of logic and argument and to highlight the epistemic dimension that for Mill has every argument and that, it is in the light of this epistemic dimension, that an argument should be assessed. By taking into account these considerations, I focus on his criticism against deductive arguments to the effect that they commit the fallacy of begging the question. I try to show that this idea relies on his radical empiricism (...) and argue that he is wrong. He particularly fails to recognize how we can gain knowledge from deductive arguments, though their conclusions are already contained in the premises. Finally, I point out the fact that, by his insisting in the epistemic dimension of arguments, Mill’s ideas are closer to those of argumentative theorists. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, se examinan y discuten dos argumentos con consecuencias reduccionistas debidos a Jaegwon Kim y a Theodore Sider respectivamente. De acuerdo con el argumento de Kim, la superveniencia fuerte implicaría la coexistencia necesaria de propiedades (es decir, tal y como normalmente se interpreta, la reducción). De acuerdo con el de Sider, ocurriría lo mismo con la superveniencia global. Uno y otro hacen un uso esencial de sendas nociones de propiedad maximal, las cuales son discutidas aquí a la (...) luz de una interpretación natural e interesante de la teoría de las propiedades implícita en sus argumentos. Bajo esta nueva interpretación, en términos modelo-teóricos (véase apartado 4), obtenemos diversas posibilidades de relaciones formales entre las tesis de supervivencia y la reducción, según la lógica utilizada. Al menos bajo una interpretación interesante, los argumentos de Kim y Sider no son correctos, quedando demostrado así que dichos argumentos no son válidos en general. (shrink)

We discuss and analyze two reductive arguments due to Jaegwon Kim and Theodore Sider respectively. According to the first one, strong supervenience would imply necessary coextension of properties. According to the second, this would be also the case of global supervenience. Kim and Sider make essential use of their respective notions of maximal properties, which we analyze here in the light of a natural and interesting interpretation of the underlying theory of properties. Under this interpretation, in terms of model theory, (...) we obtain different possibilities of formal relations between the superveniencie theses and reduction, depending on the logic we use. Under at least one interesting interpretation, the arguments of Kim and Sider are not correct and we become the conclusion that these arguments are not valid in general. (shrink)

In the present paper, I try to defend a coherent interpretation of Goodman�s relativism by responding to the main objections of the critics. I also discuss the significance of his pluralism by relating it to the notion of construction. This will show the relevance of Goodman�s philosophy for the present days.

In this work, I analyze our concept of cause in the face of criticism of Bertrand Russell in his article “On the Notion of Cause”. For Russell, there is an estrangement between the notion of cause and mature science of physics. The word cause (and its correlates) would not be used in physics, thus eliminating the main justification of philosophy for his job—the foundation of science. Thus, the various causal notions and the principle of causality should be abandoned by philosophers (...) as something outdated. The aim of this study is to assess the extent to which our notion of cause, with its asymmetric nature, can be explained by physics and investigate the question of the existence of causes in our world. (shrink)

This paper examines the asymmetrical aspect of causal relation, confronting it to Humean and Neo-Humean's view. Following Hausman and Ehring, we favor a situational approach to causal asymmetry. We explore the Hausman's analysis of flagpole's example, clearing the connexions between causation and explanation. Our general diagnosis is that the Neo-humean tradition wrongly supposes that nomic relations, with the exception of minor details, exhaust the causal relations.

Constituye la primera monografía que, en castellano, se publica sobre Jacques Derrida. Las cuestiones que se abordan aquí nos demuestran, cosa que no es poco, como mediante su pensamiento nos es más lúcida la comprensión de la tradición occidental.

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende esclarecer a problemática da epistemologia como fundamento para a compreensão filosófica das ciências. Para isso, contamos com a visão do filósofo francês Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), focando principalmente no seu texto O racionalismo aplicado (publicado em 1949) e a sua teoria que busca demonstrar a complexidade presente nas linhas de pensamento construídas na história da filosofia: o empirismo e o racionalismo.

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar a aparente contradição entre a instituição da censura no Contrato Social de Rousseau e a censura que sofreu em Genebra e Paris. Para tanto analisaremos o conceito de censura no Contrato Social e os argumentos utilizados por Rousseau nas obras Cartas escritas da Montanha e a Carta à Christophe Beaumont, com apoio na obra de alguns comentadores da obra política de Rousseau. Nossos estudos nos levam a concluir que Jean-Jacques Rousseau admite, de fato, a (...) possibilidade da instituição da censura, no entanto, a ação dos censores deve ser restrita pela opinião pública, tal como a do príncipe em relação às leis. Além disso, se há um processo semelhante deveria atender todos os requisitos da legislação civil do Estado no qual ocorre. Tanto em Paris, como em Genebra Rousseau discorda do modo como procederam em relação às suas obras e sua pessoa. (shrink)

Our main aim is to discuss the topic of scientific controversies in the context of a recent issue that has been the centre of attention of many epistemologists though not of argumentation theorists or philosophers of science, namely the ethics of belief in face of rational disagreement. We think that the consideration of scientific examples may be of help in the epistemological debate on rational disagreement, making clear some of the deficiencies of the discussion as it has been produced until (...) now. Another central claim of our paper is that the common view according to which beliefs (and changes of beliefs) may exhibit and commonly exhibit a deontic status can be clarified in the light of Brandom’s approach to normative pragmatics and the pragmatic theories of argumentation that also have a normative character (here our example is van Eemeren’s pragma-dialectics). Our article highlights the similarities between both projects, similarities that to our knowledge were not noticed before. Finally, an important point of the article is that we need to take contextual elements into account in order to develop an adequate theory of disagreement. (shrink)

«Jo només escric», diu l'autor, «quan les sensacions o idees se'm fan dimonis íntims que intento foragitar amb la literatura. Però no resulta fàcil sentir ni pensar amb naturalitat i seguretat, superar els propis vertígens i censures, deixar avançar la ment amb la confi ança que trobarà el que busca, la mateixa confiança amb què el rei s'asseu sense mirar enrere, segur que trobarà la cadira que algú li haurà acostat.Un entorn raonablement sensual i fins i tot una relativa gimnàstica (...) sexual ajuden sens dubte l'esperit: el que aquest no admet és cap lligam sentimental. Al cervell no li roba energia el moblament sensual o l'erotisme profilàctic, és a dir, tot allò que apaivaga un cos que ha de funcionar alhora com la seva font d'energia i el seu instrument. El pensament ens permet, doncs, el que ens estabilitza però no el que ens mobilitza; tolera el que ens gratifica però no el que ens sedueix. Més que en la repressió, el pensament i la cultura es basen en la fredor, s'aixequen sobre l'egoisme i es mantenen a força de narcisisme. Ens perdonen tal volta els plaers, però mai els amors». (shrink)

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative (...) purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model. (shrink)

According to sparse modalism, the notion of essence can be analysed in terms of necessity and naturalness. In this paper, I develop and defend a version of sparse modalism that is equipped with a non-standard, relativized conception of naturalness. According to this conception, properties and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different kinds of things, and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different slots. I argue that this relativized version of sparse modalism can accommodate (...) various cases that the standard, non-relativized version can’t. The alternative version can accommodate cases where a relation is essential to a relatum but merely necessary to another, cases where a property is essential to an object but merely necessary to another, and cases where a less-than-perfectly natural property is essential to an object. (shrink)